AfCFTA: African dream or nightmare?

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has been widely heralded as a flagship initiative of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, designed to expand intra-African trade, drive industrialisation, and stimulate economic growth through market integration. A recent critique published by Bilaterals, however, casts doubt on the agreement’s ability to achieve these ambitions. The article argues that, although the AfCFTA originates from good (African) intentions, its negotiation, financing, and operational structures have been shaped to a considerable extent by external actors, including major foreign economic blocs and multilateral organisations. The technical support provided by these actors is depicted as a disguised effort to advance their own economic and geopolitical interests at the expense of Africa’s industrial development. Moreover, conditional funding and the promotion of regulatory norms aligned with Global North standards, it claims, risk perpetuating dependency and entrenching Africa’s subordinate role in the global economy.

The article further questions whether the AfCFTA can realistically deliver on its promises of industrialisation and deeper intra-African trade. While tariff reduction, harmonisation of standards, and regional market integration are in principle conducive to economies of scale, market diversification, industrial development and acceleration of growth are not automatic. The article warns that accelerated liberalisation without corresponding industrial capacity (particularly in weaker economies) may even exacerbate inequalities between African states and trigger processes of deindustrialisation. This concern is not unfounded: empirical studies have demonstrated that premature trade liberalisation has, in certain cases, contributed to deindustrialisation in low-income countries, especially within Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, the way this argument is framed rests on flawed logic, as it oversimplifies the complex and reciprocal relationship between trade liberalisation and industrial development. The critique reduces the relation between these two factors to a renewed version of the long-standing sequencing debate: should trade liberalisation precede industrial development, or must a strong industrial base first be established before liberalizing markets?

The relationship between trade liberalisation and industrialisation is not linear, as the article implies, but circular. Trade liberalization drives industrial growth by opening new markets, attracting investment, and generating economies of scale. On the other hand, industrial development enhances the capacity of countries to reap the gains of market liberalisation, to capture greater value along supply chains, and to avoid relegation to the role of low-value exporters. In this sense, the relationship between liberalisation and industrialisation should not be conceived as a one-directional sequence. Trade integration creates incentives for industrial upgrading, while industrial capacity strengthens the ability to fully exploit the opportunities created by liberalised markets. This equation captures, in essence, the dynamics of the proverbial “chicken-and-egg” dilemma. Properly supported by domestic policy frameworks, the AfCFTA could thus function both as a platform for trade-led industrialisation and as a catalyst for structural diversification.

The article also emphasises the structural asymmetries that mark African trade. It predicts that industrially advanced regions such as Southern and West Africa will dominate intra-continental exchanges, while less developed areas, particularly in Central Africa, risk being reduced to consumer markets due to their limited productive capacity and marginal integration in global value chains. Furthermore, it warns that liberalisation could disproportionately burden small traders, artisans, and rural communities. These are valid concerns, yet the article presents them as almost inevitable outcomes, neglecting the possibility of policy mechanisms (such as phased liberalisation, targeted industrial policies, or social protection schemes) that could redistribute benefits more equitably and shield vulnerable groups from these risks.

Equally unconvincing is the article’s treatment of external involvement, which it reduces to a manifestation of neocolonialism. This perspective not only oversimplifies the complexity of contemporary international partnerships but also diminishes the role of African policymakers by casting them as passive victims of decisions taken elsewhere and disregarding their capability of leveraging the AfCFTA as a vehicle for structural transformation. While it is undeniable that external actors exert influence through infrastructure financing, capacity-building programmes, and technical assistance, such influence does not totally deprives African states of sovereign decision-making authority. Governments retain a certain degree of capacity to negotiate terms, accept or reject conditions, and strategically harness external partnerships to advance domestic priorities.

The critique advanced by Bilaterals should not lead us to view the AfCFTA as a nightmare, but neither this agreement should be regarded simply as a dream. Dreams, by their very nature, are temporary and inevitably give way to reality. For the AfCFTA to move beyond aspiration and deliver tangible results, ambition must be translated into action. This requires all stakeholders to confront the concrete challenges and remove the bottlenecks that will ultimately determine whether the agreement evolves into a genuinely transformative project or fades into an unrealised promise. In the end, the Bilaterals article serves as a reminder that agreements such as the AfCFTA are not self-fulfilling. Their ultimate effectiveness, and the trajectory they set for the African economy, will depend not on statistical projections, theoretical models, or lofty declarations, but on the creation of genuine synergies among all actors involved in implementation coupled with the adoption of adequate policies to manage risks and absorb shocks that this implementation implies. It is through this collective and often painful process of translating commitments into concrete policies, institutions, and practices that the AfCFTA’s promises will either take root, or dissipate.