The Enhanced EU–Indian Ocean EPA: Between Opportunity and Sovereignty

On 10 June 2026, the European Commission announced the conclusion in Mauritius of an enhanced Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Comoros. The agreement represents a significant deepening of EU–Indian Ocean economic relations, moving beyond traditional tariff preferences to address a broader range of trade and investment issues. In addition to trade in goods, the enhanced EPA covers 1) Services and investment, 2) Digital trade, 3) Public procurement, 4) Intellectual property rights and 5) Sustainable development, including labour and environmental standards.

Among the most notable innovations is a comprehensive intellectual property chapter. The agreement establishes rules covering major forms of intellectual property and provides for the protection of 135 EU geographical indications (such as regional food and beverage names) in Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles, following a transition period. It also includes provisions relating to plant varieties and the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

While the European Commission presents these provisions as tools to promote innovation, investment, and a more predictable business environment, they have also become the focal point of criticism from some Malagasy civil society organizations.

In a recent public statement, these groups expressed concern that stronger intellectual property protections could, over time, affect farmers' rights related to seeds and agricultural biodiversity. Their position reflects a broader and longstanding critique of Economic Partnership Agreements in parts of Africa, which argues that trade agreements, particularly North-South agreements, should prioritize food security, rural development, and structural economic transformation rather than market liberalization alone. While the enhanced EU–Indian Ocean EPA includes provisions on services, investment, digital trade, public procurement, intellectual property, and sustainable development (areas often associated with economic transformation), critics question whether these mechanisms will adequately support domestic development objectives and preserve sufficient policy space for countries to pursue their own transformation strategies. On the other hand, the issue of food security is especially sensitive at a time when many African countries continue to face fertilizer shortages and rising agricultural input costs, which have heightened concerns about the resilience of domestic food systems.

In the specific case of the Enhanced EU–Indian Ocean EPA, the main concerns raised include:

• Lack of consultation: Critics argue that farmers' organizations and civil society representatives were not meaningfully involved in the negotiations, raising questions about transparency and democratic participation.
• Food sovereignty: Greater market opening to European products could, according to critics, undermine domestic agricultural production and reduce policy space for pursuing independent food strategies.
• Impact on small farmers: Small-scale producers may face increased competitive pressures, potentially affecting rural livelihoods and local value chains.
• Seed rights and agricultural autonomy: Concerns have been raised about the future ability of farmers to save, exchange, select, and protect seeds, practices viewed as essential to agricultural resilience and food security.

Supporters of the agreement counter that the enhanced EPA offers predictable access to one of the world's largest markets, strengthens the investment climate, facilitates economic diversification, and creates opportunities for integration into global value chains.

The debate is therefore not simply about trade. It reflects a deeper question about development itself: whether prosperity is best achieved through greater integration into global markets or through preserving policy space to protect domestic priorities during the process of economic transformation.

An interim EPA was in force with a larger group of Eastern and Southern African countries (known as EU-ESA-5 iEPA, due to its five signatory states: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe). The enhanced EPA only concerns the four Indian Ocean Island States, while at this stage, Zimbabwe is not part of it. Whether the new enhanced EPA ultimately proves to be a catalyst for development or a source of new constraints will not depend on the text itself, but on how it will be implemented and governed over time.

What is perhaps most striking is that the concerns persist despite decades of experience with similar agreements. This does not necessarily mean that the critics are right, nor that the proponents of the new agreement are wrong. Yet in public policy, persistent anxieties are rarely irrelevant. Even when fears do not materialize, they often reveal deeper questions about trust, power, participation, and control over the future. Economic agreements are never purely technical constructs; they are social compacts that must earn legitimacy not only from governments but from the societies they affect. This applies as much to bilateral arrangements as it does to continental frameworks such as the AfCFTA. When this social foundation is weak, implementation becomes fragile in practice. Even if agreements are formally adopted and legally sound, they tend to suffer in reality: people and institutions are less likely to fully comply with them, to take ownership of them, or to sustain them over time.